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Abstract 
This paper investigates the changes in market volatility around the United 
States presidential elections and inaugurations between the period of 1928 and 2016 
during selected event windows: (-10, -1) vs. (+1, +10), (-20, -1) vs. (+1, +20), … (-90, -1) 
vs. (+1, +90), respectively. To isolate the corresponding impact of different types of 
political uncertainty, market volatility is examined under three partitions: magnitude 
of surprise in voting results, incumbency, and change in ruling party. The result 
indicates that the market volatility is more willing to settle down after an election 
with new president or a change in ruling party, mainly due to the comparatively 
higher volatility induced by such political events during the pre-election window. The 
results have implications for both individual and institutional investors who are 
exposed towards volatility risk.  
 
Keywords:  presidential election, inauguration, market volatility, event study.  
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“I must study Politicks and War that my sons may have liberty to study 
Mathematicks and Philosophy.  My sons ought to study Mathematicks and 
Philosophy, Geography, natural History, Naval Architecture, navigation, 
Commerce, and Agriculture, in order to give their Children a right to study 
Painting, Poetry, Musick, Architecture, Statuary, Tapestry, and Porcelain.” 
 
 
--- John Adams (1735 – 1826) 
The second President of the United States of America 
(Letter to Abigail Adams, post 12 May 1780) 
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1: Introduction 
November 8th, 1960, presidential candidates --- Democrat John F. Kennedy and 
Republican Richard M. Nixon --- went into an incredibly narrow tie on the voting day. 
Kennedy eventually won the election by a narrow margin and was elected the 35th 
President of the United States of America, receiving merely 0.1 million more votes. 
November 3rd, 1964, one year after the tragic assassination, J. F. Kennedy’s 
formal Vice President, Democrat Lyndon B. Johnson was elected the 36th President 
with a promising win of 16 million more votes than his Republican opponent. 
November 4th, 2008, Democrat Barack H. Obama was elected the 44th 
President of the United States of America. Despite being the first African-American 
presidential candidate in America’s history, Obama won over both the presidency and 
people’s heart with almost 10 million more votes than opponent John McCain. 
November 8th, 2016, Republican Donald J. Trump was elected the 45th 
President, defeating his opponent --- Democrat, formal Secretary of State, and formal 
First Lady --- Hillary Clinton, despite Clinton receiving 2.9 million more votes. 
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These distinctive historical events and their contrasting results inspired us to 
investigate whether the change in market volatility (pre-event vs. post-event) is 
significantly different during these rather dynamic periods of political uncertainty. 
The purpose of this study is to test whether the market volatility would 
decrease after political uncertainties settle down, and which types of political 
uncertainty would induce a more significant reduction. The hypothesis is that 
political uncertainty is generally high during election periods due to the pending 
presidency and therefore potential political changes, and intuitively, market volatility 
during the pre-event window shall be especially high when (i.) there is a narrow 
margin among the polls causing big surprise in voting results, (ii.) a new president is 
considered presidency, (iii.) in addition to (ii), a change in ruling party is considered 
in place. 
Once election results are announced, the uncertainty about presidential 
outcome shall be resolved.  Hence, our first hypothesis is: (I.) after the election, 
market volatility is reduced. (II.) The second hypothesis is that the reduction in 
volatility is especially high when there is a narrow margin among the votes (i.e., 
surprise of election is large). (III). The third hypothesis is the reduction in volatility is 
especially high when a new president is elected (hence unfamiliarity); and when 
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there is a change in ruling party (hence change in political stands and policies). This 
is because the market is expected to be relatively volatile when a new president 
makes decision about cabinet appointments and policies. We augment the analysis 
with results around inauguration dates even though the predictions there can be 
more ambiguous. In general, we may expect an increase in volatility following the 
inauguration for incumbent presidents, because it is expected that policy decisions 
will be deferred till after the inauguration speech. For a new president, one may 
expect volatility to decrease given the most turbulence times is probably in the 
interim period between election and inauguration dates. 
We test these predictions using univariate t-tests and the ARCH/GARCH 
models. While t-tests returned rather ambiguous results, ARCH/GARCH models 
generally agree with our hypotheses. The ARCH/GARCH results on election days 
affirm our hypotheses (I.) and (III.), however we do not see a significant impact due 
to narrow poll margin. Consistently, ARCH/GARCH results on inauguration days also 
display affirmations on hypotheses (I.) and (III.). 
We acknowledge that our methodology and partition schemes are relatively 
preliminary, and various improvements can be implemented to further enhance the 
testing procedure. 
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2: Literature Review 
Prior studies in the related fields --- such as relation between market volatility 
and political uncertainty (Goodell and Vähämaa 2013), and relation between equity 
return and political uncertainty (Li and Born 2006) --- allowed us to draw inspiration 
in forming our own research method.  
We segmented 23 U.S. elections during the period 1928 to 2016 with 3 
simplified partitions: magnitude of surprise, incumbency, and change in ruling party. 
Similar partition mechanism was adopted in prior studies, identifying narrow margin 
of victory and change in political orientation in the government as two major factors in 
inducing volatility fluctuation. (Białkowski, Gottschalk and Wisniewski 2008). 
A prior study on the U.S. market excess return showed that the market 
performs better on average under Democratic rules than Republican (Santa-Clara and 
Valkanov 2003) (Sy and Zaman 2011). Less is known about how each of these parties 
is related to volatility. On the one hand, there is reason to suspect that volatility will 
be higher under Republican rule because both the Great Depression (1929 – 1933) 
and the financial crisis that crushed Wall Street (2007 – 2008) occurred during 
Republican rules. Hence, analysing the entire period would be problematic if one 
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wishes to get at identification. Instead, we recognize that other things may cause 
fluctuations in market performance. We hypothesize that political uncertainty and 
‘change in ruling party’ may particularly contribute to fluctuation in volatility. 
Stock prices have been found to exhibit patterns of closely following the four-
year election cycle according to a prior study on the period between January 1965 
and December 2003 (Wong and McAleer 2009). Additionally, it is argued that since 
1960, the U.S. macroeconomic policies and the election cycle have been in sync due to 
active management, where the U.S. economy would be ‘managed to expand prior to 
an election and contract thereafter’ (Allvine and O'Neill 1980) . In this paper we take 
a different route of exploration, we hypothesize that around the schedule of the major 
political events, once every four years, changes in market behaviour are expected to 
affect market volatility.  
The goal of this paper is to look for the short-term impact resulted from 
political uncertainties during selected event windows around elections and 
inaugurations. Instead of evaluating the markets 2 years around, we decided to focus 
within the 3 months before and after event window, in the hope of narrowing down 
impact forged particularly by elections (and/or inaugurations). 
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3: Data 
3.1 Market Return & Volatility 
We obtained CRSP U.S. Total Market Index daily excess returns from WRDS 
database, which gave us the daily return data starting from January 1926 and ending 
at September 2017. During this period, there were 23 presidential elections 
(therefore 23 inaugurations) in the United States. We chose the one-month U.S. 
Treasury Bill rate to approximate for the daily risk-free rate. The market volatility 
was then calculated as the standard deviation of the CRSP U.S. Total Market Index 
daily returns minus the risk-free rate under selected event windows accordingly. 
Figure 1 
CRSP U.S. Total Market Index Daily Excess Return Jan 1926 – Sep 2017 (WRDS 2017) 
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3.2 Election Data 
We extracted historical presidential election data from 270towin.com, which 
allowed us to view the number of electoral votes as well as popular votes for each 
election. 
The U.S. presidential election takes place on the first Tuesday following the 
first Monday in November, once every four years. It is an indirect election where the 
U.S. citizens vote for the 538 electors to be the U.S. Electoral College, and electors will 
then directly vote for the president. The candidate that receives more than half of the 
538 electoral votes with at least 270 electoral votes, will be elected the next president. 
It is worth mentioning that since the first on-record presidential election in 1824, 
there have been five presidential elections where the winner received more than half 
of the electoral votes but lost the popular votes. These five presidential elections took 
place in the year of 1824, 1876, 1888, 2000 and 2016, where 2000 and 2016 are in 
the sample of our study. 
Inaugurations are held on the 20th of January following the election (1937 – 
now; before 1937, inaugurations were held on March 4th). It is a ceremony celebrating 
the inception of the new four-year term of presidency. On the inauguration day, the 
new president will swear into the office and give a speech to the public. We choose 
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inauguration days to be another set of event days due to the consideration that there 
is a delay between the day the president is elected and the day the president officially 
starts to execute his / her presidential power into decision makings. We consider the 
test results on inauguration as rather supplement, for we deem the market data 
imbedded in the period immediately after election to be more revealing.  
Considering the background of the presidential election, we perceive the 
‘popular votes’ to be a suitable proxy to mirror the market expectation and reaction 
to the political uncertainty, and any future mention of ‘vote’ in this paper will be 
referring to ‘popular votes’ unless otherwise specified; therefore, to put things into 
perspective, we partitioned three perceivable and quantifiable variables: 
i. Big surprises vs. small surprise on the voting result (quantified by 
popular votes): We recognize the ratio between the two main 
candidates as a vital element in determining the intensity of the 
electoral competition. We expect a bigger surprise due to more 
uncertainty when there is a more intense competition; and a smaller 
surprise due to less uncertainty when there is a less intense 
competition. We consider the magnitude of the surprise to be positively 
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related to the change in volatility after the election, where surprise is 
calculated as: 
𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 =  − |0.5 −  
𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠
| 
‘Surprise’ is a negative indicator, and the larger the number (the closer 
it is to 0), the bigger the surprise. We therefore segment the first 11 
biggest surprises from the remaining 12 smaller surprises. 
ii. A new president elected vs. an incumbent: Among the 23 elections 
in the sample, there are nine elections with incumbents, where the 
market is more acquainted with the president elected and his / her 
political views and strategies. With more familiarity and agreement 
(being elected for the second time), we expect the market to be less 
volatile following elections with incumbents. This is testable both by 
looking at the reduction in volatility compared to cases with new 
presidents (a difference in difference analysis). Thus, identification is 
achieved by comparing the reduction in volatility that is observed for 
incumbent presidents compared to a new president elected. We define 
‘incumbency’ as the second partition. 
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iii. A change in ruling party vs. the same ruling party as the previous 
year: With Republican and Democratic Parties having sometimes 
disparate policies and philosophies towards crucial economic, political 
and social issues such as taxes, gun control, healthcare, immigration, 
gay marriage and environmental regulation, we expect the market to 
react differently when there is a change in ruling party (inducing an 
increased possibility for political changes) vs. no change in ruling party. 
We thereupon determine change-in-party to be the third partition. 
Furthermore, we subdivided three partitions into two types of events to further 
explore the actual event window(s) around which the market volatility is significantly 
impacted by political uncertainty: 
i. election day, which occurs once every four years in November; 
ii. inauguration day, which occurs once every four years in January. 
Hence, we assign the following indicators to our 23 Presidential Election sample: 
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Table 1 
Elections 1928 – 2016 & Inaugurations 1929 – 2017 with Partition Indicators  
Elections 1928 - 2016 & Inauguration 1929 - 2017 with Partition Indicators 
Election 
Year 
Inauguration 
Year 
President 
Elected 
Election / 
Inauguration 
Indicator 
Surprise 
Indicator 
Incumbency 
Indicator 
Ruling 
Party 
Indicator 
1928 1929 H. C. Hoover 1 small new same 
1932 1933 F. D. Roosevelt 2 small new change 
1936 1937 F. D. Roosevelt 3 small incumbent same 
1940 1941 F. D. Roosevelt 4 small incumbent same 
1944 1945 F. D. Roosevelt 5 big incumbent same 
1948 1949 H. S. Truman 6 big new same 
1952 1953 D. D. Eisenhower 7 small new change 
1956 1957 D. D. Eisenhower 8 small incumbent same 
1960 1961 J. F. Kennedy 9 big new change 
1964 1965 L. B. Johnson 10 small new same 
1968 1969 R. M. Nixon 11 small new change 
1972 1973 R. M. Nixon 12 small incumbent same 
1976 1977 J. Carter 13 small new change 
1980 1981 R. Reagan 14 big new change 
1984 1985 R. Reagan 15 small incumbent same 
1988 1989 G. Bush 16 big new same 
1992 1993 W. J. Clinton 17 small new change 
1996 1997 W. J. Clinton 18 big incumbent same 
2000 2001 G. W. Bush 19 big new change 
2004 2005 G. W. Bush 20 big incumbent same 
2008 2009 B. H. Obama 21 big new change 
2012 2013 B. H. Obama 22 big incumbent same 
2016 2017 D. J. Trump 23 big new change 
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4: Methodology 
We applied both t-test and ARCH/GARCH model to analyse whether there is a 
significant change between the pre-event and post-event market volatility during 
different event windows: (-10, -1) vs. (+1, +10), (-20, -1) vs. (+1, +20), (-30, -1) vs. (+1, 
+30), … (-90, -1) vs. (+1, +90), with null hypothesis: 
𝐻0 = (𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡-𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦) − (𝑝𝑟𝑒-𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦) = 0 
4.1 t-test 
4.1.1 Election Days 
Setting election days as event days, we select 9 different event windows (with 
number indicating days before/after the event day), upon which we calculated 
market volatility as the standard deviation of CRSP daily return: (-10, -1) vs. (+1, +10), 
(-20, -1) vs. (+1, +20), (-30, -1) vs. (+1, +30), … (-90, -1) vs. (+1, +90). 
i. 2-Sample t-test on volatility around event day: 
The first set of tests being performed is a 2-sample t-test on the 
difference between the pre-event volatility mean and the post-event 
volatility mean, where volatility is measured based on the standard 
deviation of daily return over the windows of [-10, -1] and [1, 10] for 
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pre-event and post-event volatility, respectively.  As a result, we have a 
sample of 23 observations of pre-event volatility and 23 observations 
of post-event volatility. We conduct t-tests to see if there is a difference 
in volatility between these two periods. We also repeat the analysis for 
more event windows of 20, 30, 40… 90, where in all cases the event 
window is based on the same number of days for the pre- and post-
period respectively.  
ii. 1-Sample t-test on the percentage change in market volatility: 
We generate a new variable diff% as the percentage change in market 
volatility around event days under selected event windows, with diff% 
calculated as: 
𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓% =  (
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡-𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑝𝑟𝑒-𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
 −  1) 
A 1-sample t-test is therefore conducted upon diff%, and is repeated for 
9 event windows accordingly.  
iii. 1-Sample t-test on the value change in market volatility: 
Similarly, to analyze the value change in market volatility around event 
days, we generate another new variable diff#, calculated as: 
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𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓#  =  𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡-𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 −  𝑝𝑟𝑒-𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 
Accordingly, a 1-sample t-test is performed upon diff#, and is repeated 
for 9 event windows.  
4.1.2 Election Days with Partitions 
In the hope of separating the influence under each type of political uncertainty, 
we divide the sample of 23 elections based on 3 election characteristics: 
1) Surprise (11 elections of big surprise, and 12 of small surprise); 
2) Incumbency (14 elections of new presidents, and 9 of incumbents); 
3) Ruling party (10 elections of changing ruling party, 13 of same party); 
iv. 1-sample t-test on difference in difference among partition 
Because we can measure for each election the difference in volatility 
(post-event volatility minus pre-event volatility) with two different 
measures (𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓%,  𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓#), we are also able to conduct a difference in 
difference analysis to see whether the changes observed around the 
event differ across different election characteristics. 
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4.1.3 Inauguration Days (and with Partitions) 
We repeat the identical procedure for inaugurations, with inauguration days 
as event days. Same t-tests i. – iv. are performed on the inauguration sample and sub-
samples for 9 event windows respectively. Since none of the partition induce any 
discrepancy in segmentation between election and inauguration, the size of 
inauguration sample and sub-samples are the same as their corresponding election 
sample. 
4.2 ARCH / GARCH 
For a dynamic modelling of the volatility changes, we also employ the ARCH 
and GARCH models to better describe the variance of excess returns around a 90-day 
event window. The autoregressive conditionally heteroscedastic model, which is 
known as ARCH model, is used to analyse the variance of returns over a given period. 
We use a ARCH (1/1) models in the following format to test whether there is 
a difference between the volatility before and after the event day: The GARCH (1,1) 
model being employed is as follows: 
𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝜀𝑡−1
2  + 𝛽1 𝜎𝑡−1
2  + 𝛽2 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡-𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +  𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 (1) 
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, where 𝜀t-1 is the residual in the previous trading day, and 𝜎𝑡−1
2 is the volatility in the 
previous day. The post-election is an indicator that equals one during the 90 days 
after the event, and zero otherwise. We also analyze the data with a more elaborated 
GARCH (1,1) specification, where in Eq. (1) we also include 23 election indicators, as 
well as 23 interaction terms (where the post-election) is interacted with if of the 
election indicators.  As follows, 
𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝛼1 𝜀𝑡−1
2  + 𝛽1 𝜎𝑡−1
2 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖
23
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖 
23
𝑖=1 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡-𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 +  𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟  (2) 
Where 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖  are the 23 indicators (one for each election) and 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡-𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖  are 
23 indicators that equals one only in the post period of the election.  
v. Chi-square test within partitions 
Additionally, to further utilize the partitions between election 
characteristics, we perform a set of Chi-square test to see whether the 
coefficient of the interaction terms ( 𝛿𝑖  𝑖𝑛 eq. (2)) are significantly 
different across the various election characteristics. 
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5: Empirical Results 
The results are presented in the following tables, with Panel A exhibiting test 
results for election days and Panel B exhibiting results for inauguration days. *, **, 
and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively, indicating we can 
reject our previously stated null hypothesis: 
𝐻0 = (𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡-𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦) − (𝑝𝑟𝑒-𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦) = 0 
5.1 t-test 
5.1.1 Volatility changes around event dates 
As displayed in Table 2, we find no significant volatility change around election 
days, and few volatility changes around inauguration days, where market volatility 
tends to increase after the president moves into the White House 10 days, 30 days 
and 40 days around. One possible interpretation could be, now that the new president 
can officially implement his / her political stands and strategies, policy changes are 
made, resulting in changes in market expectations and higher volatility. The test 
result affirms our intention to isolate individual types of political uncertainty by 
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concentrating on the previously stated election characteristics; surprise, incumbency 
and change in ruling party. 
Table 2 
 Changes in volatility around elections (1928-2016) and inaugurations (1929-2017) 
Table 2 provides difference t-test results between market volatility before and after event day. The 
event is the 23 election days (during the period 1928-2016) in Panel A and the 23 inauguration 
days in Panel B. Market volatility is measured for 9 different time horizons before and after the 
event day, as shown under Number of Days. Volatility is the standard deviation of excess value-
weighted return (market return minus risk-free return) during the respective period. The last 
three ‘t-score’ columns provide different mean tests: (1) t-tests that compares the sample of 23 ex-
post volatilities to 23 ex-ante volatilities, (2) t-test whether (ex-post volatility)/(ex-ante 
volatility)-1=0, (3) t-test whether ex-post volatility=ex-ante volatility.*, **, *** represent 10%, 5%, 
1% significance, respectively. 
Panel A: Election Day 1928-2016 
Number 
of days 
Volatility 
Before 
Event 
Volatility 
After 
Event 
(1) 
Difference in 
Volatility 
(t-Statistic) 
(2) 
Percentage Change 
in Volatility 
(t-Statistic) 
(3) 
Value Change in 
Volatility 
(t-Statistic) 
10 0.00914 0.01032 0.00118 (0.434) 0.20899 (1.198) 0.00118 (1.103) 
20 0.00957 0.01018 0.00060 (0.200) 0.17412 (1.189) 0.00060 (0.810) 
30 0.00964 0.00979 0.00014 (0.052) 0.11725 (1.203) 0.00014 (0.192) 
40 0.00952 0.00938 -0.00014 (-0.052) 0.09546 (1.160) -0.00014 (-0.157) 
50 0.00927 0.00903 -0.00024 (-0.101) 0.07022 (0.996) -0.00024 (-0.299) 
60 0.00899 0.00871 -0.00027 (-0.121) 0.04323 (0.665) -0.00027 (-0.365) 
70 0.00908 0.00861 -0.00047 (-0.222) 0.00636 (0.119) -0.00047 (-0.646) 
80 0.00908 0.00859 -0.00050 (-0.238) 0.00894 (0.173) -0.00050 (-0.649) 
90 0.00894 0.00861 -0.00033 (-0.163) 0.01267 (0.237) -0.00033 (-0.467) 
Panel B: Inauguration Day 1929 - 2017 
Number 
of days 
Volatility 
Before 
Event 
Volatility 
After 
Event 
(1) 
Difference in 
Volatility 
(t-Statistic) 
(2) 
Percentage Change 
in Volatility 
(t-Statistic) 
(3) 
Value Change in 
Volatility 
(t-Statistic) 
10 0.00705 0.00846 0.00141 (0.527) *0.13608 (1.460) 0.00141 (1.111) 
20 0.00815 0.00864 0.00049 (0.237) 0.09276 (1.064) 0.00049 (0.507) 
30 0.00799 0.00872 0.00073 (0.377) *0.12063 (1.564) 0.00073 (0.805) 
40 0.00817 0.00882 0.00065 (0.301) *0.12743 (1.615) 0.00065 (0.671) 
50 0.00841 0.00878 0.00037 (0.174) 0.08736 (1.290) 0.00037 (0.426) 
60 0.00871 0.00882 0.00011 (0.055) 0.05726 (0.890) 0.00011 (0.136) 
70 0.00906 0.00885 -0.00021 (-0.101) 0.04198 (0.634) -0.00021 (-0.223) 
80 0.00906 0.00872 -0.00034 (-0.164) 0.02390 (0.371) -0.00034 (-0.357) 
90 0.00894 0.00869 -0.00025 (-0.124) 0.03671 (0.547) -0.00025 (-0.265) 
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5.1.2 Result with Partition: Surprise 
As shown in Table 3, we find no significant volatility change during the 
selected event windows around election days. This means that there is no change in 
volatility according to three types of analysis: (1) No change in volatility between the 
pre-election and post-election periods for big surprise elections (panel A.1), (2) No 
change in volatility between the pre-election and post-election periods for small 
surprise elections (panel A.2), and (3) No difference in change in volatility (between 
the pre-election and post-election period) between big surprise and small surprise 
elections (panel A.3). On the contrary, we find that during the one- to two-month 
event period around inaugurations where the president elected had won the election 
with a small surprise, market volatility tends to increase in react to the event. One 
possible interpretation is that in a small surprise election, the volatility level around 
election results is not large (and does not change much), and only after inauguration 
are the policy decision made which creates volatility in the market. 
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Table 3 
Big Surprise vs Small Surprise 
Table 3 provides t-test results on the change in market volatility before and after event day. 
We rank 23 elections by the surprise of the election results, where surprise is calculated as: the 
negative of the absolute value of (‘winner ratio’ -0.5), where winner’s ratio is the winner’s 
popular votes divided by total votes. Surprise is a negative number, but the higher it is (closer to 
zero), the larger the surprise. Panel A displays t-test results with 11 highest surprise elections 
days as event days. and compares it to t-test results with 12 lowest surprise election days. Panel 
B repeats the same procedure for inauguration days.   Volatility calculation is described in Table 
1. *, **, *** represent 10%, 5%, 1% significance, respectively. 
Panel A 
A.1: Election Day 1928-2016: Big Surprise 
Number 
of days 
Volatility 
Before 
Event 
Volatility 
After 
Event 
(1) 
Difference in 
Volatility 
(t-Statistic) 
(2) 
Percentage Change 
in Volatility 
(t-Statistic) 
(3) 
Value Change in 
Volatility 
(t-Statistic) 
10 0.01062 0.01225 0.00164 (0.358) 0.31331 (1.274) 0.00164 (1.031) 
20 0.01155 0.01239 0.00084 (0.150) 0.21366 (0.971) 0.00084 (0.733) 
30 0.01129 0.01166 0.00037 (0.074) 0.09376 (0.802) 0.00037 (0.414) 
40 0.01079 0.01128 0.00049 (0.109) 0.11971 (1.141) 0.00049 (0.470) 
50 0.01048 0.01063 0.00015 (0.038) 0.05435 (0.618) 0.00015 (0.168) 
60 0.01005 0.01033 0.00027 (0.073) 0.04868 (0.559) 0.00027 (0.355) 
70 0.00988 0.01005 0.00016 (0.047) 0.01836 (0.249) 0.00016 (0.245) 
80 0.00994 0.00992 -0.00003 (-0.008) -0.01893 (-0.328) -0.00003 (-0.047) 
90 0.00980 0.00993 0.00013 (0.041) -0.01930 (-0.324) 0.00013 (0.227) 
A.2: Election Day 1928-2016: Small Surprise 
Number 
of days 
Volatility 
Before 
Event 
Volatility 
After 
Event 
(1) 
Difference in 
Volatility 
(t-Statistic) 
(2) 
Percentage Change 
in Volatility 
(t-Statistic) 
(3) 
Value Change in 
Volatility 
(t-Statistic) 
10 0.00795 0.00840 0.00045 (0.143) 0.09788 (0.387) 0.00045 (0.319) 
20 0.00754 0.00810 0.00056 (0.218) 0.14267 (0.701) 0.00056 (0.569) 
30 0.00819 0.00802 -0.00017 (-0.059) 0.13636 (0.860) -0.00017 (-0.133) 
40 0.00836 0.00759 -0.00076 (-0.257) 0.07931 (0.612) 0.00076 (-0.519) 
50 0.00819 0.00754 -0.00065 (-0.225) 0.08437 (0.749) -0.00065 (-0.467) 
60 0.00804 0.00720 -0.00084 (-0.306) 0.03796 (0.380) -0.00084 (-0.625) 
70 0.00831 0.00726 -0.00105 (-0.405) -0.00420 (-0.052) -0.00105 (-0.824) 
80 0.00822 0.00733 -0.00089 (-0.339) 0.03483 (0.406) -0.00089 (-0.652) 
90 0.00815 0.00737 -0.00078 (-0.289) 0.04282 (0.482) -0.00078 (-0.592) 
A.3: Election Day 1928-2016: Big vs. Small Surprise 
Number 
of days 
Volatility 
Change 
under 
Big 
Surprise 
Volatility 
Change 
under 
Small 
Surprise 
(4) 
Difference in 
Value Change in Volatility 
(t-Statistic) 
(5) 
Difference in 
Percentage Change 
(t-Statistic) 
10 0.00165 0.00075 -0.00089 (-0.410) -0.20679 (-0.583) 
20 0.00084 0.00038 -0.00046 (-0.302) -0.07829 (-0.261) 
30 0.00036 -0.00006 -0.00042 (-0.274) 0.04610 (0.231) 
40 0.00046 -0.00068 -0.00114 (-0.644) -0.02960 (-0.176) 
50 0.00015 -0.00061 -0.00076 (-0.454) 0.03175 (0.220) 
60 0.00027 -0.00077 -0.00104 (-0.678) -0.00752 (-0.056) 
70 0.00016 -0.00106 -0.00122 (-0.821) -0.02159 (-0.196) 
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80 -0.00003 -0.00093 -0.00090 (-0.580) 0.05391 (0.512) 
90 0.00012 -0.00075 -0.00087 (-0.600) 0.06446 (0.592) 
Panel B 
B.1: Inauguration Day 1929-2017: Big Surprise 
Number 
of days 
Volatility 
Before 
Event 
Volatility 
After 
Event 
(1) 
Difference in 
Volatility 
(t-Statistic) 
(2) 
Percentage Change 
in Volatility 
(t-Statistic) 
(3) 
Value Change in 
Volatility 
(t-Statistic) 
10 0.00726 0.00787 0.00061 (0.261) **0.22862 (2.002) 0.00061 (1.027) 
20 0.00896 0.00807 -0.00089 (-0.366) -0.01818 (-0.191) 0.00089 (-0.740) 
30 0.00922 0.00838 -0.00084 (-0.330) 0.00796 (-0.093) -0.00084 (-0.894) 
40 0.00992 0.00892 -0.00100 (-0.306) 0.01782 (0.248) -0.00100 (-1.068) 
50 0.01022 0.00915 -0.00107 (-0.319) 0.00084 (0.012) -0.00107 (-1.139) 
60 0.01031 0.00937 -0.00094 (-0.276) 0.02317 (0.293) -0.00094 (-0.866) 
70 0.01064 0.00940 -0.00124 (-0.344) 0.03423 (0.411) -0.00124 (-0.856) 
80 0.01066 0.00919 -0.00148 (-0.416) 0.00861 (0.097) -0.00148 (-0.979) 
90 0.01050 0.00901 -0.00148 (-0.430) 0.00256 (0.029) -0.00148 (-0.994) 
B.2: Inauguration Day 1929-2017: Small Surprise 
Number 
of days 
Volatility 
Before 
Event 
Volatility 
After 
Event 
(1) 
Difference in 
Volatility 
(t-Statistic) 
(2) 
Percentage Change 
in Volatility 
(t-Statistic) 
(3) 
Value Change in 
Volatility 
(t-Statistic) 
10 0.00698 0.00923 0.00225 (0.471) 0.07229 (0.505) 0.00225 (0.935) 
20 0.00728 0.00943 0.00215 (0.641) **0.25394 (1.884) *0.00215 (1.531) 
30 0.00680 0.00922 0.00242 (0.820) **0.27858 (2.451) *0.00242 (1.728) 
40 0.00657 0.00886 0.00229 (0.801) **0.24964 (1.913) *0.00229 (1.494) 
50 0.00670 0.00866 0.00196 (0.740) **0.21390 (1.991) *0.00196 (1.493) 
60 0.00708 0.00848 0.00139 (0.563) *0.14205 (1.374) 0.00139 (1.152) 
70 0.00724 0.00850 0.00126 (0.532) 0.11402 (1.182) 0.00126 (1.088) 
80 0.00725 0.00843 0.00118 (0.502) 0.09803 (1.112) 0.00118 (1.087) 
90 0.00719 0.00851 0.00132 (0.565) 0.12458 (1.342) 0.00132 (1.223) 
B.3: Inauguration Day 1929-2017: Big vs. Small Surprise 
Number 
of days 
Volatility 
Change under 
Big Surprise 
Volatility 
Change under 
Small Surprise 
(4) 
Difference in 
Value Change in Volatility 
(t-Statistic) 
(5) 
Difference in 
Percentage Change 
(t-Statistic) 
10 0.00051 0.00225 0.00174 (0.674) -0.13336 (-0.706) 
20 -0.00132 0.00215 **0.00347 (1.890) **0.33702 (2.071) 
30 -0.00111 0.00242 **0.00353 (2.076) **0.33025 (2.349) 
40 0.00229 0.00229 **0.00000 (1.880) *0.25554 (1.684) 
50 -0.00137 0.00196 **0.00333 (2.074) **0.26458 (2.098) 
60 -0.00128 0.00139 *0.00268 (1.670) *0.17728 (1.407) 
70 -0.00182 0.00126 *0.00307 (1.674) 0.15063 (1.145) 
80 -0.00200 0.00118 **0.00318 (1.743) 0.15501 (1.213) 
90 -0.00196 0.00132 **0.00328 (1.816) *0.18374 (1.398) 
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5.1.3 Results with Partition: Incumbency 
Table 4 presents t-test results under the partition of new president elected vs. 
incumbent elected. Election days yet again display no significant volatility change 
during selected event windows, whereas 10 and 40 days around inaugurations, 
market volatility present rather weak results that show an increase when an 
incumbent was elected. This is weakly consistent with the pervious results, that after 
inauguration volatility tends to increase, if the election is perceived with a relatively 
stable pre-election period (i.e. re-election of incumbent).  Furthermore, according to 
the 22nd Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, a president can only be elected to two 
full terms (except for Franklin D. Roosevelt, who have won the record of four 
presidential elections from 1932 to 1944, before the 22nd Amendment was passed in 
1947 (Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum 2016)) (U.S. Const. 
amend. XXII). With an incumbent elected, market interprets it as an indicator for a 
guaranteed political change during the next election. However, why market reacts to 
incumbency during the inauguration event window instead of election event window 
would require further investigations. 
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Table 4 
New Presidents vs. Incumbents 
Table 4 provides t-test results on the change in market volatility before and after event day. 
We segment 23 elections by whether there is a new president elected vs. an incumbent. 
Panel A displays t-test results with 14 elections days with new presidents as event days, and 
compares it to t-test results with 9 election days with incumbents. Panel B repeats the same 
procedure for inauguration days.   Volatility calculation is described in Table 1. *, **, *** represent 
10%, 5%, 1% significance, respectively. 
Panel A 
A.1: Election Day 1928-2016: New Presidents 
Number 
of days 
Volatility 
Before 
Event 
Volatility 
After 
Event 
(1) 
Difference in 
Volatility 
(t-Statistic) 
(2) 
Percentage Change in 
Volatility 
(t-Statistic) 
(3) 
Value Change in 
Volatility 
(t-Statistic) 
10 0.01072 0.01195 0.00122 (0.288) 0.17308 (0.858) 0.00122 (0.905) 
20 0.01174 0.01193 0.00019 (0.040) 0.12305 (0.685) 0.00019 (0.203) 
30 0.01179 0.01151 -0.00028 (-0.012) 0.09056 (0.694) -0.00028 (-0.254) 
40 0.01164 0.01094 -0.00070 (-0.167) 0.07297 (0.613) -0.00070 (-0.510) 
50 0.01122 0.01041 -0.00081 (0.209) 0.04902 (0.447) -0.00081 (-0.616) 
60 0.01071 0.00997 -0.00075 (-0.206) 0.02183 (0.217) -0.00075 (-0.616) 
70 0.01051 0.00974 -0.00077 (-0.223) 0.00752 (0.087) -0.00077 (-0.639) 
80 0.01050 0.00970 -0.00080 (-0.237) 0.01586 (0.189) -0.00080 (-0.632) 
90 0.01024 0.00976 -0.00048 (-0.144) 0.03135 (0.364) -0.00048 (-0.405) 
A.2: Election Day 1928-2016: Incumbents 
Number 
of days 
Volatility 
Before 
Event 
Volatility 
After 
Event 
(1) 
Difference in 
Volatility 
(t-Statistic) 
(2) 
Percentage Change in 
Volatility 
(t-Statistic) 
(3) 
Value Change in 
Volatility 
(t-Statistic) 
10 0.00667 0.00778 0.00111 (0.571) 0.26484 (0.798) 0.00111 (0.602) 
20 0.00620 0.00745 0.00125 (0.959) 0.25357 (0.974) 0.00125 (0.998) 
30 0.00631 0.00711 0.00081 (0.826) 0.15875 (1.038) 0.00081 (0.908) 
40 0.00621 0.00696 0.00074 (0.869) 0.13045 (1.215) 0.00074 (1.129) 
50 0.00625 0.00688 0.00063 (0.919) *0.10312 (1.558) *0.00063 (1.450) 
60 0.00630 0.00677 0.00046 (0.777) 0.07653 (1.240) 0.00046 (1.192) 
70 0.00686 0.00685 -0.00001 (-0.023) 0.00455 (0.115) -0.00001 (-0.051) 
80 0.00689 0.00686 -0.00003 (-0.056) -0.00182 (-0.061) -0.00003 (-0.139) 
90 0.00691 0.00680 -0.00011 (-0.200) -0.01638 (-0.464) -0.00011 (-0.442) 
A.3: Election Day 1928-2016: New Presidents vs. Incumbents 
Number 
of days 
Volatility 
Change 
under 
Incumbents 
Volatility 
Change 
under 
New 
Presidents 
(4) 
Difference in 
Value Change in Volatility 
(t-Statistic) 
(5) 
Difference in 
Percentage Change 
(t-Statistic) 
10 0.00111 0.00122 0.00012 (0.052) -0.09175 (-0.251) 
20 0.00125 0.00019 -0.00105 (-0.681) -0.13052 (-0.427) 
30 0.00081 -0.00028 -0.00109 (-0.698) -0.06819 (-0.335) 
40 0.00074 -0.00070  -0.00144 (-0.799)  -0.05748 (-0.334) 
50 0.00063 -0.00081 -0.00144 (-0.855) -0.05418 (-0.367) 
60 0.00046 -0.00075 -0.00121 (-0.776)  -0.05470 (-0.403) 
70 -0.00001 -0.00077  -0.00076 (-0.495) 0.00297 (0.026) 
80 -0.00003 -0.00080 -0.00077 (-0.481) 0.01769 (0.163) 
90 -0.00011 -0.00044 -0.00037 (-0.247) 0.04773 (0.427) 
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Panel B 
B.1: Inauguration Day 1929-2017: New Presidents 
Number 
of days 
Volatility 
Before 
Event 
Volatility 
After 
Event 
(1) 
Difference in 
Volatility 
(t-Statistic) 
(2) 
Percentage Change 
in Volatility 
(t-Statistic) 
(3) 
Value Change in 
Volatility 
(t-Statistic) 
10 0.00835 0.01008 0.00173 (0.396) 0.07804 (0.581) 0.00173 (0.826) 
20 0.00929 0.01000 0.00071 (0.212) 0.11118 (0.863) 0.00071 (0.455) 
30 0.00905 0.00992 0.00087 (0.276) 0.11771 (1.155) 0.00087 (0.594) 
40 0.00949 0.01012 0.00063 (0.181) 0.10783 (1.015) 0.00063 (0.401) 
50 0.00976 0.00998 0.00023 (0.067) 0.05419 (0.607) 0.00023 (0.164) 
60 0.00993 0.00997 0.00004 (0.012) 0.04601 (0.523) 0.00004 (0.029) 
70 0.01053 0.00990 -0.00063 (-0.186) 0.00168 (0.019) -0.00063 (-0.411) 
80 0.01056 0.00965 -0.00091 (0.273) -0.03581 (-0.445) -0.00091 (-0.602) 
90 0.01043 0.00955 -0.00088 (-0.270) -0.03417 (-0.435) -0.00088 (-0.589) 
B.2: Inauguration Day 1929-2017: Incumbents 
Number 
of days 
Volatility 
Before 
Event 
Volatility 
After 
Event 
(1) 
Difference in 
Volatility 
(t-Statistic) 
(2) 
Percentage Change 
in Volatility 
(t-Statistic) 
(3) 
Value Change in 
Volatility 
(t-Statistic) 
10 0.00502 0.00594 
**0.00092 
(1.808) 
**0.22635 
(1.931) 
*0.00092 (1.775) 
20 0.00637 0.00652 0.00015 (0.296) 0.06411 (0.605) 0.00015 (0.231) 
30 0.00634 0.00686 0.00052 (0.899) 0.12518 (1.005) 0.00052 (0.817) 
40 0.00612 0.00679 *0.00068 (1.427) 0.15792 (1.288) 0.00068 (1.173) 
50 0.00632 0.00691 0.00058 (1.050) 0.13896 (1.294) 0.00058 (0.994) 
60 0.00681 0.00704 0.00023 (0.372) 0.07476 (0.770) 0.00023 (0.411) 
70 0.00678 0.00722 0.00044 (0.675) 0.10467 (1.035) 0.00044 (0.749) 
80 0.00673 0.00728 0.00055 (0.842) 0.11677 (1.110) 0.00055 (0.879) 
90 0.00661 0.00734 0.00073 (1.054) 0.14696 (1.265) 0.00073 (1.082) 
B.3: Inauguration Day 1929-2017: New Presidents vs. Incumbents 
Number 
of days 
Volatility 
Change 
under 
Incumbents 
Volatility 
Change 
under 
New 
Presidents 
(4) 
Difference in 
Value Change in Volatility 
(t-Statistic) 
(5) 
Difference in 
Percentage Change 
(t-Statistic) 
10 0.00092 0.00173 0.00081 (0.302) -0.14831 (-0.769) 
20 0.00015 0.00071 0.00056 (0.275) 0.04707 (0.258) 
30 0.00052 0.00087 0.00035 (0.181) -0.00748 (0.046) 
40 0.00068 0.00063 -0.00005 (-0.024) -0.05009 (-0.304) 
50 0.00058 0.00023 -0.00036 (-0.198) -0.08477 (-0.602) 
60 0.00023 0.00004 -0.00019 (0.109) -0.02874 (-0.213) 
70 0.00044 -0.00063 -0.00107 (-0.538) -0.10299 (-0.752) 
80 0.00055 -0.00091 -0.00147 (-0.744) -0.15257 (-1.164) 
90 0.00073 -0.00088 -0.00161 (-0.824) *-0.18113 (-1.342) 
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5.1.4 Results with Partition: Change in Ruling Party 
Table 5 shows the t-test results for volatility change under the partition of 
change in ruling party vs. same ruling party. Market volatility increases more after 
the election when the same party continues to rule as opposed to a different party. 
Admittedly, this is counter intuitive as one expects volatility to be higher with a new 
ruling party.  
The results concerning inauguration days are rather weak and not significant 
relation is found. 
Table 5 
Change vs. Same Party 
Table 5 provides t-test results on the change in market volatility before and after event day. 
We segment 23 elections by whether there is a change in party being elected from previous year vs. 
the same party elected. Panel A displays t-test results with 10 elections days with a change in party 
as event days, and compares it to t-test results with 13 election days with the same party. Panel B 
repeats the same procedure for inauguration days.   Volatility calculation is described in Table 1. *, 
**, *** represent 10%, 5%, 1% significance, respectively. 
Panel A 
A.1: Election Day 1928-2016: Change Party 
Number 
of days 
Volatility 
Before 
Event 
Volatility 
After 
Event 
(1) 
Difference in 
Volatility 
(t-Statistic) 
(2) 
Percentage Change 
in Volatility 
(t-Statistic) 
(3) 
Value Change in 
Volatility 
(t-Statistic) 
10 0.01296 0.01275 -0.00021 (-0.038) -0.05773 (-0.755) -0.00021 (-0.266) 
20 0.01407 0.01321 -0.00086 (-0.133) *-0.10763 (-1.746) *-0.00086 (-1.581) 
30 0.01440 0.01243 -0.00198 (-0.327) **-0.13476 (-1.897) *-0.00198 (-1.714) 
40 0.01416 0.01194 -0.00221 (-0.390) 0.10085 (-0.921) -0.00221 (-1.266) 
50 0.01352 0.01143 -0.00209 (-0.399) -0.09358 (-0.928) -0.00209 (-1.247) 
60 0.01285 0.01092 -0.00194 (-0.395) *-0.11937 (-1.454) -0.00194 (-1.227) 
70 0.01240 0.01069 -0.00171 (-0.368) -0.09966 (-1.278) -0.00171 (-1.105) 
80 0.01222 0.01058 -0.00164 (-0.362) -0.07794 (-1.063) -0.00164 (-1.013) 
90 0.01201 0.01073 -0.00129 (-0.287) -0.06428 (-0.860) -0.00129 (-0.818) 
A.2: Election Day 1928-2016: Same Party 
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Number 
of days 
Volatility 
Before 
Event 
Volatility 
After 
Event 
(1) 
Difference in 
Volatility 
(t-Statistic) 
(2) 
Percentage Change 
in Volatility 
(t-Statistic) 
(3) 
Value Change in 
Volatility 
(t-Statistic) 
10 0.00635 0.00831 0.00196 (1.083) 0.39986 (1.351) 0.00196 (1.139) 
20 0.00590 0.00779 *0.00189 (1.616) *0.39527 (1.641) *0.00189 (1.655) 
30 0.00603 0.00770 *0.00167 (1.645) **0.30887 (2.135) **0.00167 (1.904) 
40 0.00595 0.00737 *0.00142 (1.640) **0.25207 (2.446) **0.00142 (2.206) 
50 0.00603 0.00716 *0.00113 (1.477) **0.19586 (2.289) **0.00113 (2.165) 
60 0.00604 0.00699 *0.00095 (1.339) **0.16805 (2.018) **0.00095 (1.913) 
70 0.00649 0.00698 0.00049 (0.739) 0.08832 (1.301) 0.00049 (1.169) 
80 0.00660 0.00702 0.00041 (0.633) 0.07609 (1.108) 0.00041 (1.026) 
90 0.00657 0.00696 0.00039 (0.591) 0.07265 (0.986) 0.00039 (0.925) 
A.3: Election Day 1928-2016: Change vs. Same Party 
Number 
of days 
Volatility 
Change 
under 
Change 
Party 
Volatility 
Change 
under 
Same 
Party 
Difference in 
Value Change in Volatility 
(t-Statistic) 
Difference in 
Percentage Change 
(t-Statistic) 
10 0.00015 0.00197 0.00183 (0.842) 0.44597 (1.286) 
20 -0.00107 0.00189 **0.00297 (2.123) **0.51119 (1.819) 
30 -0.00184 0.00167 ***0.00350 (2.592) **0.43964 (2.486) 
40 -0.00212 0.00139 **0.00351 (2.145) **0.34308 (2.248) 
50 -0.00203 0.00113 **0.00316 (2.055) **0.28761 (2.189) 
60 -0.00186 0.00094 **0.00280 (1.955) **0.28411 (2.386) 
70 -0.00172 0.00048 *0.00221 (1.534) **0.18709 (1.811) 
80 -0.00168 0.00041 *0.00210 (1.382) *0.15394 (1.518) 
90 -0.00126 0.00038 0.00164 (1.144) 0.13471 (1.263) 
Panel B 
B.1: Inauguration Day 1929-2017: Change Party 
Number 
of days 
Volatility 
Before 
Event 
Volatility 
After 
Event 
(1) 
Difference in 
Volatility 
(t-Statistic) 
(2) 
Percentage Change 
in Volatility 
(t-Statistic) 
(3) 
Value Change in 
Volatility 
(t-Statistic) 
10 0.01015 0.01212 0.00197 (0.332) 0.03305 (0.198) 0.00197 (0.668) 
20 0.01036 0.01111 0.00075 (0.165) 0.09303 (0.533) 0.00075 (0.342) 
30 0.01023 0.01098 0.00075 (0.176) 0.08296 (0.621) 0.00075 (0.364) 
40 0.01092 0.01139 0.00047 (0.099) 0.08937 (0.636) 0.00047 (0.212) 
50 0.01118 0.01137 0.00019 (0.041) 0.06587 (0.536) 0.00019 (0.096) 
60 0.01138 0.01135 -0.00003 (-0.007) 0.05748 (0.475) -0.00003 (-0.017) 
70 0.01173 0.01124 -0.00050 (-0.108) 0.04799 (0.420) -0.00050 (-0.232) 
80 0.01186 0.01093 -0.00092 (-0.203) -0.00663 (-0.063) -0.00092 (-0.435) 
90 0.01177 0.01083 -0.00094 (-0.213) -0.01772 (-0.172) -0.00094 (-0.450) 
B.2: Inauguration Day 1929-2017: Same Party 
Number 
of days 
Volatility 
Before 
Event 
Volatility 
After 
Event 
(1) 
Difference in 
Volatility 
(t-Statistic) 
(2) 
Percentage Change 
in Volatility 
(t-Statistic) 
(3) 
Value Change in 
Volatility 
(t-Statistic) 
10 0.00466 0.00565 *0.00099 (1.342) **0.21532 (2.059) **0.00099 (2.076) 
20 0.00645 0.00674 0.00029 (0.332) 0.09255 (1.103) 0.00029 (0.569) 
30 0.00626 0.00698 0.00072 (0.886) *0.14961 (1.592) *0.00072 (1.443) 
40 0.00605 0.00684 0.00078 (1.160) *0.15670 (1.686) *0.00078 (1.733) 
50 0.00629 0.00679 0.00051 (0.755) 0.10389 (1.332) 0.00051 (1.172) 
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60 0.00666 0.00688 0.00022 (0.327) 0.05709 (0.810) 0.00022 (0.538) 
70 0.00701 0.00702 0.00001 (0.006) 0.03736 (0.458) 0.00001 (0.009) 
80 0.00691 0.00702 0.00011 (0.132) 0.04738 (0.566) 0.00011 (0.193) 
90 0.00676 0.00703 0.00028 (0.352) 0.07857 (0.871) 0.00028 (0.485) 
B.3: Inauguration Day 1929-2017: Change vs. Same Party 
Number 
of days 
Volatility 
Change 
under 
Change 
Party 
Volatility 
Change 
under 
Same Party 
Difference in 
Value Change in Volatility 
(t-Statistic) 
Difference in 
Percentage Change 
(t-Statistic) 
10 0.00197 0.00099 -0.00098 (-0.373) 0.18227 (0.968) 
20 0.00075 0.00029 -0.00046 (-0.228) -0.00047 (-0.003) 
30 0.00075 0.00072 -0.00003 (-0.015) 0.06666 (0.420) 
40 0.00047 0.00078 0.00032 (0.160) 0.06733 (0.415) 
50 0.00019 0.00051 0.00032 (0.179) 0.03801 (0.272) 
60 -0.00003 0.00022 0.00026 (0.149) -0.00039 (-0.003) 
70 -0.00050 0.00001 0.00050 (0.255) -0.01064 (-0.078) 
80 -0.00092 0.00011 0.00103 (0.527) 0.05401 (0.407) 
90 -0.00094 0.00028 0.00122 (0.630) 0.09629 (0.704) 
 
In summary, the t-test results are rather ambiguous. We next try to analyze the 
relation using the dynamic specification of the GARCH model. 
 
5.2 ARCH / GARCH 
The ARCH and GARCH models yield somehow opposite results to the t-tests. 
While in Table 4, t-tests demonstrate a tendency of volatility increase when an 
incumbent is elected, and Table 5 exhibits few critical findings under the ruling party 
indicator. However, none of the significance occurs during the 90 days event window. 
Hence, we approach the same issue with ARCH / GARCH models in the hope of a more 
robust result. 
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Table 6 Panel A displays test results 90 days around election day, while Panel 
B presents test results for inauguration day. 
From Table 6 Panel A.3, we can see that market volatility reacts differently to 
elections with new present (with average coefficient of -0.0003 (A.3.b)) vs. incumbent 
(-0.0026 (A.3.b)); as well as to elections with changing ruling party (-0.0002 (A.3.d)) 
vs. the same party (-0.0020 (A.3.d)). We interpret the results as the market is 
comparatively more willing to settle after the election when there are indications for 
a stable environment (incumbent, same party). 
For inauguration (Panel B.3), similar patterns occur. Comparing the average 
coefficient, we see that market volatility is more likely to decrease when a new 
president inaugurated (-0.0013 (B.3.b)). This is consistent with Panel A. GARCH, since 
for elections with incumbents, volatility has already settled down after election (Panel 
A.3.b), resulting in a comparatively higher post-election volatility (≈ pre-inauguration 
volatility). Market volatility tends to also decrease after the inauguration with change 
in ruling party. We deem the results as consistent to Panel A for the similar reason. 
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Table 6 
ARCH: Ex-Ante vs. Ex-Post Market Volatility 
Table 6 displays ARCH & GARCH model results for 23 Elections (Panel A) and 23 Inaugurations (Panel B). We use the 
ARCH and GARCH models to describe the variance of excess returns in a 90-day period in different scenarios. We use 
an indicator for each of the 23 post-election date periods. For example, the 1928 post indicator equals one for the 
period after the election date, respectively, and zero otherwise. We use the Z test to see whether the means of two 
samples are significantly different or not. *, **, *** represent 10%, 5%, 1% significance respectively. 
Panel A.1 Election Day 1928 - 2016 
  Observation Coefficient z 
arch (L1) 4149 0.44262 ***27.62 
garch (L1) 4149 0.50104 ***26.11 
post-election indicator 4149 -0.00006 -0.28 
Panel A.2 Election Day 1928 - 2016 (by Election) 
  
Election 
Indicator 
Surprise 
Indicator 
Incumbent 
Indicator 
Party 
Indicator 
Coefficient z 
arch (L1)         0.50092 ***27.24 
garch (L1)         0.43782 ***19.62 
1928 post indicator 1 small new same -0.00095 -0.68 
1932 post indicator 2 small new change 0.00176 1.03 
1936 post indicator 3 small incumbent same -0.00729 ***-4.75 
1940 post indicator 4 small incumbent same -0.00206 -1.22 
1944 post indicator 5 big incumbent same -0.00263 -1.44 
1948 post indicator 6 big new same -0.00012 -0.06 
1952 post indicator 7 small new change -0.00213 -1.17 
1956 post indicator 8 small incumbent same -0.00046 -0.22 
1960 post indicator 9 big new change -0.00106 -0.59 
1964 post indicator 10 small new same 0.00089 0.46 
1968 post indicator 11 small new change -0.00086 -0.37 
1972 post indicator 12 small incumbent same -0.00140 -0.58 
1976 post indicator 13 small new change 0.00195 -1.06 
1980 post indicator 14 big new change -0.00082 -0.41 
1984 post indicator 15 small incumbent same -0.00180 -1.04 
1988 post indicator 16 big new same -0.00240 -1.34 
1992 post indicator 17 small new change -0.00027 -0.16 
1996 post indicator 18 big incumbent same -0.00030 -0.16 
2000 post indicator 19 big new change 0.00001 0.01 
2004 post indicator 20 big incumbent same -0.00880 ***-5.14 
2008 post indicator 21 big new change 0.00055 0.30 
2012 post indicator 22 big incumbent same 0.00121 0.80 
2016 post indicator 23 big new change -0.00134 -0.81 
Panel A.3 Chi-Square Test 
  Chi2 P>chi2     Chi2 P>chi2 
(a) Difference between 
post big and small surprise 
0.01 0.922 
(b) Difference between 
post new president and incumbent 
***14.74 0.000 
big surprise  
average coefficient 
-0.0014   Incumbent average coefficient -0.0026   
small surprise  
average coefficient 
-0.0011   New president average coefficient -0.0003   
  Chi2 P>chi2     Chi2 P>chi2 
(c) Sum of post-election 
interaction 
0.99 0.321 
(d) Difference between 
post change party and same 
***7.37 0.007 
    change party average coefficient -0.0002   
    same party average coefficient -0.0020   
Panel B.1 Inauguration Day 1929 - 2017 
  Observation Coefficient z 
arch (L1) 4157 0.44051 ***28.74 
garch (L1) 4157 0.53003 ***25.66 
  30 
post-inauguration 
indicator 
4157 -0.00030 -1.30 
Panel B.2 Inauguration Day 1929 - 2017 (by Inauguration) 
  
Election 
Indicator 
Surprise 
Indicator 
Incumbent 
Indicator 
Party 
Indicator 
Coefficient z 
arch (L1)         0.50272 ***28.25 
garch (L1)         0.46411 ***21.94 
1929 post indicator 1 small new same -0.00093 -0.67 
1933 post indicator 2 small new change -0.00447 **-2.55 
1937 post indicator 3 small incumbent same 0.00717 ***4.57 
1941 post indicator 4 small incumbent same -0.00403 **-2.29 
1945 post indicator 5 big incumbent same -0.00112 -0.60 
1949 post indicator 6 big new same -0.00109 -0.56 
1953 post indicator 7 small new change -0.00187 -1.01 
1957 post indicator 8 small incumbent same -0.00153 -0.81 
1961 post indicator 9 big new change 0.00051 0.28 
1965 post indicator 10 small new same -0.00136 -0.71 
1969 post indicator 11 small new change -0.00122 -0.53 
1973 post indicator 12 small incumbent same -0.00133 -0.54 
1977 post indicator 13 small new change -0.00356 **-1.97 
1981 post indicator 14 big new change -0.00219 -1.11 
1985 post indicator 15 small incumbent same -0.00219 -0.15 
1989 post indicator 16 big new same -0.00025 0.18 
1993 post indicator 17 small new change 0.00033 -0.42 
1997 post indicator 18 big incumbent same -0.00071 -0.62 
2001 post indicator 19 big new change -0.00116 -1.52 
2005 post indicator 20 big incumbent same -0.00235 -1.49 
2009 post indicator 21 big new change -0.00151 -0.86 
2013 post indicator 22 big incumbent same 0.00138 0.89 
2017 post indicator 23 big new change 0.00041 0.23 
Panel B.3 Chi-Square Test 
  Chi2 P>chi2     Chi2 P>chi2 
(a) Difference between 
post big and small surprise 
0.37 0.545 
(b) Difference between 
post new president and incumbent 
***4.71 0.030 
big surprise  
average coefficient 
-0.0008   Incumbent average coefficient -0.0005   
small surprise  
average coefficient 
-0.0012   New president average coefficient -0.0013   
  Chi2 P>chi2     Chi2 P>chi2 
(c) Sum of post-election 
interaction 
0.53 0.466 
(d) Difference between 
post change party and same 
***6.14 0.013 
    change party average coefficient -0.0015   
    same party average coefficient -0.0006   
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Upon observation, we can see a significant volatility decrease around the 1936 
election, where there was a small surprise, an incumbent elected and no change in 
ruling party. All three indicators point to less uncertainty, which aligns with 1936 
election’s negative z-value. Another significant volatility decrease happens around 
the 2004 election, where there was a big surprise, an incumbent elected and no 
change in ruling party. These examples suggest that the big/small surprise are less 
important distinctions than the continuity in party/presidency. This is also found 
based on the GARCH (1,1) specification of Table 6, Panel A.3. 
Hence, Panel A.3. affirms our hypotheses that market tends to stabilize, and 
volatility would reduce when the incumbent president continues to serve. This seems 
to be consistent with a more stable period following the resolution of uncertainty 
after the election.   
As for inauguration days, Panel B.3. displays results consistent with A.3, 
namely, given that volatility is lower following the election of incumbent (same party) 
president; the opposite is true following inauguration, when policy decision seems to 
increase volatility after inauguration.  
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6: Conclusions 
In conclusion, the ARCH/GARCH model seem to provide interpretation that is 
more aligned with theoretical argument. Differently, the t-test analysis provides for 
rather low power, and conflicting results, suggesting that it may not be a very robust 
way for analysing volatility changes. We thus interpret the results based on the 
GARCH model as providing some evidence that volatility tends to decrease after 
election results when the incumbent president (or party) policies are known. The 
opposite seems to happen after inauguration, when policy changes are expected.  
We at the same time acknowledge the following potential improvements: (1) 
Sample size: due to limited market data, we have only 23 observations in the 
preliminary sample which is considerably small. (2) Partition methods: we defined 
the magnitude of surprise using a simple arithmetic difference. Instead, the logarithm 
of pre- and post-volatility ratio can be used as a more sophisticated proxy.  (3) Event 
windows: event windows can also be linked to crucial sub-events before and after 
the major event, such as the Presidential Debates and the Vice-Presidential Debate. 
(4) Turnout rate: U.S. citizens’ turnout rate (a percentage calculated as the number 
of voting participants divided by the corresponding year’s census voting-age 
population) has been around only 55% for the past 40 years (U.S. Census Bureau 
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2011). It implies that even though it is reasonable to see voting results as a 
resemblance of the aggregate market opinion towards the political events, the voting 
results are not a summation of every market participant’s opinion as we would ideally 
like it to be. We fail to capture 45% of market expectation by depending solely on 
voting results. (5) Poll prediction: rather than utilizing only voting results, pre-
election poll predictions can also be included in the model in calculating surprise; (6) 
Contingency: as much as we would like to discover a relationship between a certain 
political uncertainty and the market volatility, we must accept that the U.S. 
Presidential Elections are events that are enormously exposed to contingencies. 
Assassination (and therefor compassion), scandals (and therefor defection), war and 
crisis (and therefore a pessimistic market), partisanship (and therefor voting against 
interest), or simply a president elected with zero prior political experience (and 
therefor confusion and disagreement), can all contingently impact the empirical 
results. Upon developing the capability to isolate contingencies, we shall feel more 
confident about the empirical results. 
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Appendix 
Table 7 
U.S. Presidential Election Historical Data, 1928 – 2016 (270towin.com 2017) 
Election   Electoral Data 
Year Month Day   Candidate Party 
Electoral 
Vote 
Popular Vote 
1920 nov 2   W. G. Harding Rep 404 16152200 
        J. M. Cox Dem 127 9147353 
        E. Debs Soc 0 919799 
                
1924 nov 4   C. Coolidge Rep 382 15725016 
        J. W. Davis Dem 136 8386503 
        R. M. LaFollette Pro 13 4822856 
                
1928 nov 6   H. C. Hoover Rep 444 21391381 
        A. E. Smith Dem 87 15016443 
                
1932 nov 8   F. D. Roosevelt Dem 472 22821857 
        H. C. Hoover Rep 59 15761841 
                
1936 nov 3   F. D. Roosevelt Dem 523 27751597 
        A. M. Landon Rep 8 16679583 
                
1940 nov 5   F. D. Roosevelt Dem 449 27244160 
        W. L. Willkie Rep 82 22305198 
                
1944 nov 7   F. D. Roosevelt Dem 432 25602504 
        T. E. Dewey Rep 99 22006285 
                
1948 nov 2   H. S. Truman Dem 303 24105695 
        T. E. Dewey Rep 189 21969170 
        J. S. Thurmond State Right Dem 39 1169021 
        H. Wallace Pro 0 1157328 
                
1952 nov 4   D. D. Eisenhower Rep 442 33778963 
        A. Stevenson Dem 89 27314992 
                
1956 nov 6   D. D. Eisenhower Rep 457 35581003 
        A. Stevenson Dem 73 25738765 
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1960 nov 8   J. F. Kennedy Dem 303 34227096 
        R. M. Nixon Rep 219 34107646 
        H. F. Byrd Dem 15 116248 
                
1964 nov 3   L. B. Johnson Dem 486 42825463 
        B. M. Goldwater Rep 52 27146969 
                
1968 nov 5   R. M. Nixon Rep 301 31710470 
        H. H. Humphrey Dem 191 30898055 
        G. C. Wallace American Inde 46 9906473 
                
1972 nov 7   R. M. Nixon Rep 520 46740323 
        G. McGovern Dem 17 28901598 
                
1976 nov 2   J. Carter Dem 297 40825839 
        G. R. Ford Rep 240 29147770 
                
1980 nov 4   R. Reagan Rep 489 43901821 
        J. Carter Dem 49 35483820 
        J. Anderson Inde 0 5719850 
        Ed Clark Lib 0 921128 
                
1984 nov 6   R. Reagan Rep 525 52455000 
        W. F. Mondale Dem 13 37577000 
                
1988 nov 8   G. Bush Rep 426 47946000 
        M. S. Dukakis Dem 111 41016000 
                
1992 nov 3   W. J. Clinton Dem 370 44908254 
        G. Bush Rep 168 39102343 
        R. Perot Inde 0 19743821 
                
1996 nov 5   W. J. Clinton Dem 379 45590703 
        R. Dole Rep 159 37816307 
        R. Perot Reform 0 8085294 
                
2000 nov 7   G. W. Bush Rep 271 50456062 
        A. Gore, Jr. Dem 266 50996582 
        R. Nader Green 0 2882955 
                
2004 nov 2   G. W. Bush Rep 286 62039073 
        J. F. Kerry Dem 251 59027478 
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2008 nov 4   B. H. Obama Dem 365 69456897 
        J. S. McCain Rep 173 59934814 
                
2012 nov 6   B. H. Obama Dem 332 65446032 
        W. M. Romney Rep 206 60589084 
        G. Johnson Lib 0 1275971 
                
2016 nov 8   D. J. Trump Rep 304 62980160 
        H. R. Clinton Dem 227 65845063 
        G. Johnson Lib 0 4488931 
        J. Stein Green 0 1457050 
        E. McMullin Inde 0 728830 
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